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The 26th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade notified me in January 2011 that I was to serve as a design engineer for our bases in Kabul, 
Afghanistan. That 




was in full effect, 
and U.S. Army 
vertical engineers 
were in short 
supply.1 Therefore, 
the Army relied 
heavily on Afghan 
companies for 
new construc-
tion. During the 
deployment, I was 
responsible for 
designing this new 
construction in 
the Kabul Base Cluster, projects totaling $170 million. 
My responsibilities expanded midway through the tour 
when I assumed the additional role of overseeing all 
construction operations in the region.
Having no prior experience as a civil engineer, these 
jobs were well above my expertise. Prior to deployment, 
my engineering experience focused on vehicles and 
robotics, with my only civil engineering training being in 
the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). So, like any 
good soldier, I learned, adapted, and overcame.
Over the course of the 
year, I learned a lot about 
Afghan construction. 
The following ten lessons 
proved invaluable to me 
and could likewise prove 








The process for approv-
ing new construction in 
Afghanistan was similar 
to that in the United 
States. The process began with a commander submitting 
a request for new construction. This was followed by a 
site survey and a design for the construction project. The 
project proposal went before a Joint Facilities Utilization 
Board, where a general officer, who had approval author-
ity for projects under $750,000, could approve it.2 The 
money was allocated after the project was approved.
An Afghan contractor poses for a photo while assisting with the removal of 
blast-resistant concrete barriers 6 November 2013 at Multinational Base Tirin 
Kot, Afghanistan. Civilian contractors assisted U.S. and Australian troops with the 
drawdown of the base and the transfer of the remaining facilities to the Afghan 
National Security Forces. (Photo by Cpl. Mark Doran, Australian Defense Force)
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While the money was being procured, a complete set 
of engineering drawings and a statement of work (SOW) 
were completed. Those documents became available to 
Afghan construction companies so they could bid on 
projects. Interested companies could submit a techni-
cal proposal and a bid. We then reviewed the technical 
proposals. (These were often just reiterations of the SOW 
for technical feasibility.) Subsequently, the contract was 
awarded to the company with the most technically feasible 
proposal and the lowest cost.
Following the award of a contract, there would be a 
kick-off meeting with the Afghan companies at which 
time we would go through the SOW, answer any ques-
tions, and reiterate key deadlines. A contract officer repre-
sentative would be assigned for each project with instruc-
tions to contact us with any technical issues that arose 
between inspections. The project would then begin, with 
a typical period of performance of ninety days, although 
they typically ran thirty to sixty days over. Over the course 
of the project, we would have monthly job-site inspections 
to check progress and adherence to the SOW.
When a project was completed, it would undergo 
a final inspection, and projects that were on a major 
base required an additional inspection by the Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP 
is a program where an American company contracts 
logistics support for the military. The LOGCAP in-
cluded companies such as KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor.3 
In my region, Fluor had the LOGCAP contract. Fluor 
representatives would inspect the new construction, and, 
upon a successful inspection, they would take ownership 
of the upkeep and maintenance of the building.
Expedited projects could go through this entire 
process in four to six months; however, most projects 
would take six to eight months. Due to the length of 
the process, which often overlapped unit deployments, 
Afghan contractors reinforce the roof of a school under construction 19 January 2012 in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 
Twelve permanent schools were under construction by Afghan contractors in the Garmsir District. A civil affairs team in support of the 3rd 
Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, visited several of the sites to inspect the structures and ensure compliance with the quality assurance standards 
of the Afghan government. (Photo by Cpl. Reece Lodder, U.S. Marine Corps)
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the majority of our construction was designed by our 
predecessors. Similarly, the majority of our designs were 
built by our successors.
Lesson 2—Afghan Companies Often 
Would Mislead You to Get a Contract
Afghanistan has 
been in turmoil since 
the Russian invasion 
in 1979. With the 
high level of dan-
ger associated with 
living in an active war 
zone, many Afghans 
have developed a 
Darwinian survivalist 
mentality and a keen 
sense of opportun-
ism, especially about 
competing for money, 
which is viewed as the 
key for survival. This 
ruthlessly competitive 
impulse was whetted 
with the appearance 
of the U.S. Army, 
which had a substan-
tial amount of money 
that it was clearly 
anxious to spend on 
new construction. 
Not surprisingly, in 
the ensuing scramble 
for money, Afghan 
companies desiring to 
secure construction contracts often provided misleading 
technical proposals and bids. For example, Afghan com-
panies would claim that they possessed capabilities they 
did not have. Similarly, Afghan companies would agree 
to schedules that they had no ability to meet.
Moreover, as a money-bilking strategy, Afghan 
companies would habitually belabor the cost of any 
modifications that were made in our designs. Although 
our designs went through significant scrutiny, due to the 
sheer volume of new construction and the short timelines 
in which such construction was expected to be complet-
ed, it was difficult to catch all the planning oversights. 
For example, we were constructing a two-story barracks 
building that required a staircase. However, though 
the drawings included the staircase, the SOW failed to 
specifically mention it. In response, the Afghan compa-
ny demanded an additional $100,000 for the staircase. 
Although we could have had another company construct 
it for a fraction of the 
cost, we would have 
needed to start a new 
construction process, 
and the barracks 
would have been 
uninhabitable for 
another six months. 
So we determined 
that it was more cost 
effective to pay the 
additional cost in 
the interest of time 
to meet the mission. 
The lesson is to 
ensure the SOW is 
precise not only for 
the sake of intrinsic 
accuracy but also to 
avoid the necessity of 
caviling with greedy 
Afghan contractors 
who demand outra-





“Afghan” Construction Companies 
Was Often Obscure and Dubious
Opportunism was not exclusive to Afghans. A major 
collateral intent of MAAWS-A was to put money into 
the Afghan economy, but some of the construction 
companies were not owned by Afghans. Although up-
per-class Afghan citizens owned the bulk of the compa-
nies, several were owned by American expatriates who 
had previously been in Afghanistan as contractors or as 
part of the military. Such expatriates apparently saw the 
large amount of money that the Army was willing to 
pay for projects and the low cost of labor. Consequently, 
Afghan contractors help Afghan National Army soldiers build a latrine 7 February 
2013 near Takir, Afghanistan. (Photo by 1st Lt. Gerrelaine Alcordo, U.S. Army)
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among such, the bulk of the money that was intended to 
infuse the Afghan economy no doubt ended up infusing 
personal economies elsewhere.
For example, during one preconstruction meeting, 
the owner of one Afghan company arrived; he was a tall 
American with a common access card (CAC) that indi-
cated he was a GS-15–level U.S. government employee. 
I had our base security investigate him and found that 
his CAC had been issued the previous year when he was 
working for the U.S. government.
During another job-site inspection, I met with a 
dubious owner of another company. Although Afghan, 
he had been a refugee who grew up in England, re-
ceived a master’s degree in engineering from Oxford 
Brookes University, and returned to Afghanistan to 
take over the family construction company. Former 
Afghan refugees owned a number of construction 
companies; although the majority had been refugees 
in Pakistan, several had returned to Afghanistan from 
Europe and North America, attracted by the poten-
tial of earning lucrative windfall profits from the U.S. 
Army construction program.
Among all such companies, even those owned 
by local Afghans, there appeared to be a pervasive 
degree of corruption at some level. For example, in 
one bidding process, we discovered that multiple 
construction companies were owned by a single 
individual and that these companies were submitting 
competing bids for projects during a process that 
attempted to hide their true ownership. Later, this set 
of companies was blacklisted when it was discovered 
that the owner had close ties to the Taliban.
However, it is worth noting that the corruption we 
found in the ownership of Afghan companies did not 
extend to Afghan labor. Afghan laborers were typically 
paid $5 per day. These personnel were working to pro-
vide the minimum necessities for their families, and $5 
per day was adequate to feed a family.
Navy Lt. Stephen Gustafson, Khost Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) engineer, teaches proper masonry supply storage to local engineers, 
construction contractors, and foremen during a monthly contractor training session on 14 November 2009 at the Civil Military Operations 
Center in Khost, Afghanistan. Engineers from the Khost PRT provided construction quality-assurance training to locals to facilitate high-quality 
construction practices in the region. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Stephen J. Otero, U.S. Air Force)
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Lesson 4—Afghan Lifestyle Meant 
Timelines Had to Be Flexible
Our mobilization training had prepared us for the 
term inshallah (God willing) and the fatalistic concept 
implied by it. The Afghans would often use this term to 
describe failure to meet work timelines, especially when 
they had little intent on meeting them. In response, 
we would typically be compelled to add 50 percent 
contingency time onto the end of project timelines to 
mitigate the Afghan inability to stick to an American-
style construction schedule.
However, another unexpected issue arose from the 
final LOGCAP inspections of projects. Fluor would 
often reject the electrical or plumbing work, and would 
then ask for substantial amounts of money to fix it. 
Though paying Fluor to resolve the issues would have 
been much more expedient, we legally had to return to 
the Afghan companies as part of their original con-
tract. We would then be forced to watch over the work 
to ensure that all corrections were properly made. It 
would typically take two to four months from the proj-
ect-completion date before the construction was fully 
complete and the facility was ready for use.
Another large problem with keeping on project 
schedules was caused by Ramadan. The construction 
schedules submitted by companies routinely did not 
account for work slowdown during the Muslim holy 
month resulting from the religious obligation for work-
ers to abstain from food and water throughout daylight  
hours extending from sunrise to nightfall. Though 
Ramadan was a significant societal event with practical 
impact on the lifestyle of most Afghans, management 
would not put projects on hold, and construction 
crews were still expected to work during Ramadan. A 
common result was that, due to fasting, crews would 
be so exhausted from the heat that, by midday, they 
would attempt to escape the sun, and the majority of 
physically demanding labor would come to a halt. As 
a result, the construction timelines would have to be 
pushed into the night after crews had broken their day’s 
fast after sunset.
Lesson 5—The Bulk of the 
Construction Material Came 
from Russia
The civil engineering courses that I attend-
ed during BOLC taught reliance on American 
construction materials (e.g., lumber and I-beams). 
However, similarly graded materials up to American 
standards were often difficult for Afghan companies 
to secure domestically since Afghanistan did not have 
the natural resources or production infrastructure to 
manufacture them. Therefore, most of the construc-
tion materials were imported from Russia, and the 
cost of importing those materials drove up the price 
for projects. For example, standard pressure-treated 
Russian lumber was five times more expensive than 
U.S. lumber, and many sizes were not available.
Despite the seeming challenge of acquiring suit-
able substitutes for American-grade building mate-
rials, Afghan construction companies nevertheless 
still insisted that they could get any of the requested 
materials. For example, we had a project that required 
I-beams, and my original design called for American 
standard I-beams that were calculated from Field 
Manual 3-34.40, General Engineering.4 We included a 
similar Russian I-beam that would be more readily 
available in Afghanistan, but the Afghan construction 
company insisted that they had American I-beams.
However, upon starting construction, we observed 
that the contractors were welding sheets of metal 
to replicate I-beams in form. These ad hoc I-beams 
clearly did not have the adequate structural properties 
required for the heavy construction contemplated. 
Notwithstanding, the owner of the Afghan company 
proceeded to vehemently argue that the welded sheets 
were, in fact, I-beams delivered from the United States.
A key lesson is the necessity to closely monitor 
the construction materials employed by Afghan 
companies since these companies often attempt to 
substitute substandard materials for those stipulated 
in the contract.
Lesson 6—Afghans Have Experience 
with Concrete but Typically of 
Dubious Quality
The Afghans have used concrete for construc-
tion for centuries so they have experience with it. 
However, their standards for mixing concrete were 
significantly less stringent than what we required and 
designed for, as our designs would call for 4,000-psi 
reinforced concrete. Unfortunately, it was our expe-
rience that we were often given falsified test reports 
that stated that the concrete was 4,000-psi when it 
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came time to pour, but would then fail the slump test 
that we gave it to verify the test report.5
The consequences of using poorly mixed concrete 
were everywhere. For example, as part of a humani-
tarian project, a well was built in one of the villages 
on the outskirts of Kabul. When I inspected the well, 
parts of the concrete broke off in my hand. Clearly 
visible in the mix were twigs and debris from the 
ground. Upon further analysis, it appeared that the 
contractor had used loose soil instead of sand in the 
concrete blend.
The issue of substandard concrete arose in large 
measure because Afghan construction companies typ-
ically preferred hand-mixing concrete. Hand-mixing 
involves dumping sand, rocks, cement, and water onto 
the ground and mixing it with shovels. The resulting 
concrete often failed to meet the basic standards for 
concrete. In one instance, we tested out a sample of 
hand-mixed concrete and it readily fractured at pres-
sures well below that of 4,000-psi concrete, not even 
exceeding the standard for 1,000-psi concrete.
Lesson 7—Afghan Carpentry Had to 
Be Closely Monitored
The standard Army building on semipermanent 
bases is the barracks hut (B-hut), which is a twen-
ty-by-forty-foot wooden structure. My base, Camp 
Phoenix, had roughly eighty B-huts. Army engineers 
built some of these B-huts, and Afghan construction 
companies built some as well. Those constructed by 
the Afghans were not outwardly distinguishable from 
those made by the Army engineers.
However, two issues arose from the use of wooden 
structures. First, the lumber was at a premium and 
Mohammed Mohsin, a deputy provincial manager with the Central Asia Development Group, discusses a construction project with Lt. Col. 
Joseph Cetta, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team and Combined Task Force Arrowhead, and Trisha Bury, a field program officer with the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), on 23 July 2012 outside the district center at Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. The project is part of 
an effort by USAID and the Afghan government to keep military-aged males and at-risk populations employed in programs that will improve 
the community. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Brendan Mackie, U.S. Army)
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was typically imported from Russia. As such, the se-
lection was limited and expensive. Second, though the 
outer surfaces of the wooden structures were paint-
ed in an attempt to help prevent deterioration from 
weather, the Afghan carpenters had used gasoline in-
stead of turpentine or other more suitable additive to 
dilute the paint, and the gasoline had impregnated the 
wood. As a result, during the dry, windy season, the 
B-huts were prone to catching fire. Not surprisingly, 
our brigade commander did not allow his soldiers to 
stay in those B-huts due to the fire risk.
Lesson 8—Afghan Electrical Work 
Did Not Meet American Standards
The Afghans had few electricians trained to U.S. 
electrical standards. However, the Afghan compa-
nies would never admit they did not have adequately 
trained electricians because our SOWs required them. 
On the contrary, the technical proposals from con-
struction companies would routinely indicate they 
had a licensed electrician that met the SOW require-
ment. However, from evaluating hundreds of technical 
proposals, we discovered that every company claimed 
the same three licensed electricians. As it turned out, 
these electricians were American expatriates who were 
presumably in very high demand. But, notwithstand-
ing their assured presence in the proposals approved, 
over the course of the year, we never saw any of these 
electricians on any of our job sites.
Additionally, the quality of electrical supplies 
Afghan companies attempted to use was a major issue—
many of the electrical components were fake. We found 
wires that had the wrong gauges and certifications 
stamped on them. Additionally, though our SOWs re-
quired that our electrical panels be “UL/CE approved,” 
more often than not, Afghan companies would attempt 
to pass off counterfeit panel boxes merely by affixing 
“UL/CE approved” stickers to them.6
To mitigate these problems, we were able to provide 
significant oversight on the electrical work since our 
National Guard team included a signal noncommis-
sioned officer who was a civilian master electrician. He 
would go through initial inspections, help the Afghans, 
and perform general quality control. Due to the ubiqui-
tous attempts by Afghan companies at deceit and fraud 
associated with electrical work, over the course of the 
year, he was one of the busiest men in Kabul.
Lesson 9—Afghan Plumbing Work 
Did Not Meet American Standards
The Afghans’ ability to do plumbing was on par with 
their ability to do electrical work. Similar to the poor 
quality of their electrical work, plumbing was character-
ized by leaks caused by mismatched fittings, bad welds, 
and poor seals. Additionally, Afghan contractors would 
use imported counterfeit parts from Russia when they 
thought they could get away with it.
One of our larger projects was construction of four 
two-story barracks with a latrine on each floor. Each 
floor could house a hundred and twenty soldiers. The 
projects were expected to be completed by mid-2009. 
However, the plumbing had to be reinstalled twice, both 
times due to a large number of leaks in the pipes. Not 
surprisingly, these were caused by mismatched fittings, 
bad welds, and poor seals.
We also had issues with latrine-shower-sink (LSS) 
units. These were eight-by-twenty-foot shipping con-
tainers converted into latrines with showers, toilets, 
and sinks. However, while the majority of Afghans 
were not familiar with Western plumbing, the issue 
with the units was more than that. Though our initial 
inclination was to blame the contractors, a real contrib-
uting problem was that our SOWs and drawings were 
incomplete. In the end, the issue was largely resolved by 
updating the documents.
Lesson 10—Safety Standards Are 
Fairly Lax on Afghan Job Sites
Our SOW mandated that the construction sites 
were Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) compliant. However, although we had no safety 
incidents for the entire year, the construction sites were 
far from compliant. The Afghans loathed personal pro-
tective equipment and never wore hearing or eye protec-
tion, even while welding or operating heavy equipment. 
They were expected to wear hard hats, and they would 
bring them to job sites, but they would never wear them. 
At one point, we saw them using their hard hats as mix-
ing bowls for concrete. Additionally, the Afghan labor 
would walk up and down the ladders backwards, even 
on icy days, and they would stand on top of fifteen-foot 
Texas barriers as the cranes were moving them.
It is hard to know what lesson one derives from such 
a situation other than to try to be understanding and 
supportive within the cultural context one is confronted.
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Conclusion
Although the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan 
has decreased, Afghan companies will continue to 
perform the majority of new construction required on 
our bases. Awareness of the ten lessons discussed above 
gleaned from personal experience and observations are 
intended to help any soldier placed in charge of design-
ing or overseeing Afghan construction prepare for the 
challenge. I suggest that the major overall lessons are that 
the Afghan companies hired to perform the work require 
close monitoring and significant oversight, and that we 
appreciate the necessity of operating with a reasonable 
expectation that there will be cost and schedule overruns.
Though the situation described above might seem at 
first depressing, it is important to note that the structures 
we constructed were eventually built to standard, and the 
construction missions were successfully accomplished. 
For a war that had been going on for fifteen years and 
cost $5 trillion, our schedule and cost overruns to com-
plete them seemed trivial.
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